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1 Introduction
We investigate the local dynamics in the neighborhood of a steady state in an economy
where agents face financial constraints and goods are produced in two sectors with
sector-specific production externalities.
There are earlier works that investigate the local dynamics in an economy with
financial constraints. Among others, Kiyotaki and Moore [16] and Cordoba and
Ripoll [13, 14] demonstrate that equilibrium is unique and dampening cycles can
occur in a collateral-constrained economy. In the model by Cordoba and Ripoll
[14], a unique steady state is a saddle point under plausible parameter conditions.
Woodford [24] and Barinci and Che´ron [5] focus on an economy where capitalists and
workers co-exist and show that indeterminacy can occur because workers face financial
constraints.1 Benhabib and Wang [10] and Liu and Wang [18] create a mechanism
where financial constraints are the potential source of indeterminacy. In their models,
the presence of a fixed cost directly or indirectly affecting financial constraints is a
crucial factor for indeterminacy to occur. All the above-mentioned studies assume
that an economy is endowed with an aggregate production sector in which only one
final good is produced. In the current study, we consider an economy with two
production sectors. We analyze how the interaction between the extent of financial
constraints and the sector-specific production externalities affects the characterization
of equilibria in a two-sector economy.2
Over the past twenty years, many researchers have investigated multiple equilib-
ria or indeterminacy of equilibria in dynamic general equilibrium models.3 It is well
known that indeterminacy causes self-fulfilling sunspot business fluctuations (Shell
[22]; Azariadis [4]; Cass and Shell [12]; Woodford [23]). In this literature, production
externalities have been an important feature of the model because they are a source
of inefficiency that causes indeterminacy of equilibria. Among others, Benhabib and
Nishimura [8] demonstrate that indeterminacy can easily occur in a model with two
production sectors even though production externalities are small, provided that cap-
1In contrast to Woodford [24], Barinci and Che´ron [5] consider an economy with increasing-
return-to-scale production externalities.
2We do not assume any fixed cost that affects financial constraints.
3See, for instance, Benhabib and Farmer [6, 7], Benhabib and Nishimura [8], Borldrin and Rus-
tichini [11], Benhabib et al. [9], Nishimura and Shimomura [19], Nishimura and Venditti [20, 21],
and Dufourt et al. [15].
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ital goods are labor intensive from the private perspective and capital intensive from
the social perspective. In the current paper, a financial market is explicitly introduced
in the two production sector model. In particular, agents face financial constraints
and can borrow only up to a certain proportion of their own funds in our model.
In each period, they receive an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Agents who draw
higher productivity become borrowers (capital producers) and agents who draw lower
productivity become lenders. In other words, borrowers and lenders endogenously ap-
pear in equilibrium.
Our main finding is that under the moderate parameter conditions, if financial
constraints are severe, equilibrium is uniquely determined, with the steady state be-
ing a saddle point, whereas if the financial constraints are relaxed, equilibrium is
indeterminate, with the steady state being totally stable.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model
is presented in which the two production sectors exhibit sector-specific production
externalities and agents face financial constraints. In section 3, we derive equilibrium
and the dynamical system. In section 4, we characterize the dynamic property around
the steady state and obtain the condition for the extent of financial constraints to
produce multiple equilibria. Section 5 concludes the current study.
2 Model
A closed economy continues from time 0 to +∞ in discrete time and consists of an in-
finitely lived representative firm and infinitely lived agents, whose population is equal
to 1. In each period, the representative firm produces both consumption and interme-
diate goods. The intermediate goods are numeraire throughout the current analysis.
The infinitely lived agents have potential investment opportunities to produce capital
from the intermediate goods, but receive uninsured idiosyncratic productivity shocks
in each period that affect the productivity in capital production.
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2.1 Agents
2.1.1 Timing of events
Fig. 1 illustrates the timing of the events at time t. At the beginning of time t when
the idiosyncratic productivity shock has not yet been realized, an agent earns the
following incomes: a wage income, returns to her saving, and a lump-sum profit from
the representative firm. The consumption good market at time t is opened at the
beginning of the period and is closed before the idiosyncratic productivity shock is
realized. Therefore, she must make a decision about consumption and saving at the
beginning of time t without knowing her productivity in order to produce capital used
at time t + 1. At the end of time t, the idiosyncratic productivity shock is realized.
There are two saving methods: one is lending her savings in the financial market and
the other is initiating an investment project. She optimally chooses one of the saving
methods with knowing her productivity. Lending one unit of savings in the financial
market at time t yields a claim to rt+1 units of intermediate goods at time t+1, where
rt+1 is the gross real interest rate. Purchasing one unit of intermediate goods at time
t for capital production creates Φt units of capital used at time t+ 1, which are sold
at price, qt+1, to the production sectors at time t+1. Although she can borrow in the
financial market when she starts to produce capital, she faces a financial constraint
and can borrow up to a certain proportion of her own funds.
Productivity Φt is a random variable on a probability space (Ω,F , P ), where Ω
is a sample space (for which one can assume Ω = [0, 1]), F is a σ-algebra on Ω, and
P is the probability meaure. Φt is a function of ωt ∈ Ω and its support is [0, η],
where η ∈ (0,∞). The cumulative distribution function of Φt is denoted by G(Φ) :=
P ({ωt ∈ Ω | Φt(ωt) ≤ Φ}), which is time-invariant and continuously differentiable
on the support, where {ωt ∈ Ω | Φt(ωt) ≤ Φ} ∈ F . Φ0, Φ1,..., are independent and
identically distributed across both agents and time (the i.i.d. assumption). There is
no insurance market for the productivity shocks, and thus, no one can insure against
low productivity. Denote the history of ωt by ω
t−1 = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt−1}. Then, we
can define a probability space (Ωt,F t, P t) that is a Cartesian product of t copies
of (Ω,F , P ), where ωt−1 is an element of Ωt. Because the measure of the agent
population is equal to one and because of the i.i.d. assumption, ωt−1 can denote an
individual who experiences the history, ωt−1 = {ω0, ω1, ..., ωt−1}.
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2.1.2 Maximization problem
An agent solves a maximization problem for her lifetime utility given in the following:
maxE
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tcτ (ωτ−1)
∣∣∣∣ ωt−1
]
subject to
pτcτ (ω
τ−1) + sτ (ωτ−1) =
qτΦτ−1(ωτ−1)xτ−1(ωτ−1) + rτbτ−1(ωτ−1) + wτ + piτ (1)
bτ (ω
τ ) ≥ −λsτ (ωτ−1) (2)
xτ (ω
τ ) ≥ 0, (3)
for τ ≥ t, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, cτ (ωτ−1) is consumption,
and E[.|ωt−1] is an expectation operator given the history, ωt−1. In what follows, by
using (2) and (3), we transform Eq. (1) into one budget constraint given by Eq. (6)
below.
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In (1), wτ and piτ are a wage income and a profit that is given from the represen-
tative firm in a lump-sum manner, respectively, and pτ is the price of consumption
goods. sτ (ω
τ−1) := xτ (ωτ ) + bτ (ωτ ) is the agent’s saving at time τ , where xτ (ωτ ) is
intermediate goods used for capital production and bτ (ω
τ ) is lending if bτ (ω
τ ) > 0
and borrowing if bτ (ω
τ ) < 0. A linear technology with respect to intermediate goods
is assumed for capital production such as Φτ−1(ωτ−1)xτ−1(ωτ−1), which is capital
produced at time τ . Eq. (1) implies that when the agent makes a decision at time
t about consumption, ct(ω
t−1), and saving, st(ωt−1) , she does not know her pro-
ductivity, Φt(ωt), as previously discussed. However, as noted from the expression
st(ω
t−1) = xt(ωt) + bt(ωt), she knows Φt(ωt) when she makes a portfolio decision
about investing in a capital production project, lending, and/or borrowing at time t.
Eq. (1) is the flow budget constraint effective for τ ≥ 1. At time 0, the flow budget
constraint is assumed to be given by p0c0 + s0 = q0K0 + w0 + pi0, where K0 is the
initial capital endowment that is common across agents.
Inequality (2) is the financial constraint the agent faces at time τ .4 Even though
an agent is willing to borrow in the financial market, she can do so only up to a partial
proportion of her savings, which is her own fund. In (2), λ ∈ (0,∞) is the extent
of financial constraints: the smaller λ is, the more severe the financial constraint is.
Inequality (2) can be rewritten as bτ (ω
τ ) ≥ −µxτ (ωτ ), where µ = λ/(1 + λ) ∈ (0, 1).
Because this constraint is more convenient than inequality (2), we use it henceforth.
As µ goes to 1, the financial market approaches perfection, and as µ goes to zero,
agents are unable to borrow in the financial market. The purchase of intermediate
goods should be nonnegative, and thus, inequality (3) is imposed.
2.1.3 Optimal portfolio decision within a period
We define φt := rt+1/qt+1. With knowing the productivity in capital production,
agents who draw Φt > φt optimally borrow up to the limit of the financial constraint
and purchase intermediate goods for capital production, whereas agents who draw
Φt ≤ φt lend all their savings in the financial market to acquire the gross interest,
4This type of financial constraints is employed by many researchers such as Aghion et al. [2],
Aghion and Banerjee [1], and Aghion et al. [3].
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rt+1.
5 Hence, φt is the cutoff for the productivity shocks that divide agents into
lenders and borrowers (capital producers) at time t, and an agent’s portfolio program
is given by
xt(ω
t) =
{
0 if Φt(ωt) ≤ φt
st(ωt−1)
1−µ if Φt(ωt) > φt,
(4)
and
bt(ω
t) =
{
st(ω
t−1) if Φt(ωt) ≤ φt
− µ
1−µst(ω
t−1) if Φt(ωt) > φt.
(5)
2.1.4 Euler equation
The portfolio program given by (4) and (5) rewrites the flow budget constraint (1) as
sτ (ω
τ−1) + pτcτ (ωτ−1) = Rτ (ωτ−1)sτ−1(ωτ−2) + wτ + piτ , (6)
where Rτ (ωτ−1) := max{rτ , (qτΦτ−1(ωτ−1)− rτµ)/(1− µ)}. The maximization of the
agent’s lifetime utility subject to (6) yields the Euler equation as follows:
pt+1 = βE
[
Rt+1(ωt)|ωt−1
]
pt. (7)
The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the lifetime utility maximization
problem consist of the Euler equation (7) as well as the transversality condition
limτ→∞ βτE[st+τ (ωt+τ−1)/pt+τ |ωt−1] = 0.
2.2 Production
The representative firm produces both intermediate and consumption goods, being
endowed with Cobb-Douglas technologies:
F¯ 1(l1t , k
1
t , l¯
1
t , k¯
1
t ) = A(l
1
t )
α1L(k1t )
α1K (l¯1t )
a1L(k¯1t )
a1K
5The derivation of an optimal portfolio allocation of savings follows Kunieda and Shibata [17].
Although agents who draw Φt = φt are indifferent between initiating a capital production project
and lending in the financial market, it is assumed that they lend their savings in the financial market.
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for intermediate goods, and
F¯ 2(l2t , k
2
t , l¯
2
t , k¯
2
t ) = B(l
2
t )
α2L(k2t )
α2K (l¯2t )
a2L(k¯2t )
a2K
for consumption goods, where αiL, α
i
K ∈ (0, 1), αiL + αiK + aiL + aiK = 1 for i = 1, 2,
and ∆ := α1Lα
2
K − α2Lα1K 6= 0. A and B are the productivity parameters. In the
production functions, lit and k
i
t are labor and capital used for the production of each
good, respectively, and l¯it and k¯
i
t are the components of production externalities with
respect to labor and capital, respectively. In equilibrium, it holds that lit = l¯
i
t and
kit = k¯
i
t, although l¯
i
t and k¯
i
t are exogenous when the firm solves the profit maximization
problem. The firm solves the following maximization problem:
max
l1t ,l
2
t ,k
1
t ,k
2
t
Πt := F¯
1(l1t , k
1
t , l¯
1
t , k¯
1
t ) + ptF¯
2(l2t , k
2
t , l¯
2
t , k¯
2
t ) + (1− δ)kt − qtkt − wtlt, (8)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate and kt = k1t + k2t is the total capital
in the economy. It is assumed that the remaining capital, (1− δ)kt, after production
at time t can be used as intermediate goods, and thus, the total intermediate goods,
F¯ 1(l1t , k
1
t , l¯
1
t , k¯
1
t ) + (1 − δ)kt, are sold to capital producers. The total labor supply is
given by l1t + l
2
t = lt, which is equal to the population of agents, i.e., lt = 1. The
first-order conditions for the profit maximization problem are given by
Aα1L
(
k1t
l1t
)1−θ1
= ptBα
2
L
(
k2t
l2t
)1−θ2
= wt. (9)
and
Aα1K
(
k1t
l1t
)−θ1
= ptBα
2
K
(
k2t
l2t
)−θ2
= qt + δ − 1, (10)
where θi := α
i
L + a
i
L for i = 1, 2. Note that we have used equilibrium conditions,
lit = l¯
i
t and k
i
t = k¯
i
t, to obtain (9) and (10). Assumption 1 below is imposed so that
the law of demand for each input is satisfied.
Assumption 1. θi ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2.
Eqs. (9) and (10) yield
k1t =
α1Kwt
α1L(qt+δ−1)
l1t and k
2
t =
α2Kwt
α2L(qt+δ−1)
l2t (11)
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Eqs. (9) and (10) also yield
wt = Ψp
1−θ1
θ2−θ1
t =: w(pt) and qt + δ − 1 = Λp
−θ1
θ2−θ1
t =: v(pt), (12)
where
Ψ := [(A(α1L)
θ1(α1K)
1−θ1)θ2−1(B(α2L)
θ2(α2K)
1−θ2)1−θ1 ]1/(θ2−θ1)
and
Λ := [(A(α1L)
θ1(α1K)
1−θ1)θ2(B(α2L)
θ2(α2K)
1−θ2)−θ1 ]1/(θ2−θ1).
As in Benhabib and Nishimura [8], it is said that if ∆ = α1Lα
2
K − α2Lα1K > (<)0,
the intermediate goods are labor (capital) intensive from the private perspective and
if θ1 > (<)θ2, the intermediate goods are labor (capital) intensive from the social
perspective.
3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is expressed by sequences of prices: {wt, qt, pt, rt+1} for all
t ≥ 0 and allocation: {kt, k1t , k2t , lt, l1t , l2t } for all t ≥ 0 and {ct(ωt−1), st(ωt−1), xt(ωt), bt(ωt)}
for all t ≥ 0, ωt, and ωt−1, so that (i) for each ωt and ωt−1, the consumer maximizes
her lifetime utility from time t onward; (ii) the representative firm maximizes its prof-
its in each period; and (iii) consumption and intermediate goods markets, a financial
market, a capital market, and a labor market clear.6
3.1 Market clearing conditions
Because in each time, the total consumption is equal to the production of consumption
goods, the consumption goods market clearing condition is given by
Ct :=
∫
Ωt
ct(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1) = F 2(k2t , l
2
t ), (13)
where F 2(k2t , l
2
t ) := F¯
2(l2t , k
2
t , l
2
t , k
2
t ). As seen in (4), the intermediate goods are pur-
chased by agents who draw higher productivity, such that Φt(ωt) > φt. Therefore,
6To be accurate, c0 is not subject to any history of the stochastic events and ω
−1 is empty.
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the intermediate goods market clearing condition is given by∫
Ωt×(Ω\Ξt)
xt(ω
t)dP t+1(ωt) = F 1(k1t , l
1
t ) + (1− δ)kt, (14)
where Ξt = {ωt ∈ Ω|Φt(ωt) ≤ φt} and F 1(k1t , l1t ) := F¯ 1(l1t , k1t , l1t , k1t ). Because, in the
financial market, all lending and borrowing are cancelled out, it follows that∫
Ωt+1
bt(ω
t)dP t+1(ωt) = 0, (15)
which is the financial market clearing condition. From (15), we obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. The financial market clearing condition (15) is satisfied if and only if∫
Ωt×Ξt
st(ω
t−1)dP t+1(ωt) =
µ
1− µ
∫
Ωt×(Ω\Ξt)
st(ω
t−1)dP t+1(ωt).
Proof. Inserting (5) into the financial market clearing condition (15) yields the desired
equation. 
Capital is supplied by agents who draw higher productivity such that Φt(ωt) > φt
and is demanded by the representative firm. Hence, the capital market clearing
condition is given by
k1t+1 + k
2
t+1 =
∫
Ωt×(Ω\Ξt)
Φt(ωt)xt(ω
t)dP t+1(ωt). (16)
Finally, the labor market clearing condition is given by
l1t + l
2
t = lt = 1. (17)
3.2 Production in equilibrium
From (11), k1t + k
2
t = kt, and l
1
t + l
2
t = 1, the production functions become as follows:
F 1(l1t , k
1
t ) = −
α2Lv(pt)kt − α2Kw(pt)
∆
(18)
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and
ptF
2(l2t , k
2
t ) =
α1Lv(pt)kt − α1Kw(pt)
∆
. (19)
From (18) and (19), the gross product, Yt = F
1(l1t , k
1
t ) + ptF
2(l2t , k
2
t ), is obtained as
follows:
Yt =
(α1L − α2L)v(pt)kt + (α2K − α1K)w(pt)
∆
. (20)
3.3 Cutoff
The financial market clearing condition (15) yields a time-invariant cutoff, φt = φ
∗,
in equilibrium that divides agents into lenders and borrowers.
Proposition 1. The cutoff, φ∗, is given by
G(φ∗) = µ. (21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Because the cumulative distribution function is strictly increasing over the sup-
port, φ∗ = G−1(µ) is uniquely determined. As µ increases, φ∗ increases. This means
that as the financial constraints are relaxed, the number of lenders increases and the
number of capital producers decreases. Although the number of capital producers
decreases, allocative inefficiency with respect to the use of intermediate goods is cor-
rected. This is because the intermediate goods are intensively used by more highly
productive agents.
3.4 Dynamical system
To aggregate the flow budget constraint (6) across all agents, we obtain Lemma 2
below, which follows from the financial market clearing condition (15).
Lemma 2. ∫
Ωt
Rt(ωt−1)st−1(ωt−2)dP t(ωt−1) = qtkt (22)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 implies that capital producers sell capital to the representative firm at
price qt. From the microeconomic perspective, the savings of agents who draw lower
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productivity are lent out to agents who draw higher productivity, and the lenders
are repaid with interest. Therefore, although the returns to individual savings vary
depending upon the individual productivity, the total income from all agents’ savings
is eventually equal to the value of total capital in the economy.
The use of Lemma 2 aggregates the flow budget constraint (6) across all agents
and obtains the relationship between the total demand for and the total supply of
intermediate goods. The total funds available for capital production consist of capital
producers’ savings and their borrowing from lenders through the financial market,
which is equal to the aggregate saving across all agents. The total funds are used to
purchase the intermediate goods. Lemma 3 below describes this situation.
Lemma 3. ∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1) = F 1(l1t , k
1
t ) + (1− δ)kt (23)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The left-hand side of (23) is the total demand for intermediate goods, and the
right-hand side is the total supply. As seen in (4), the intermediate goods are used by
the more highly productive agents who draw Φt(ωt) > φ
∗ to produce capital. Then,
Lemma 3 and (4) with the i.i.d. assumption regarding the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks yield capital kt+1, as in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2.
kt+1 =
H(φ∗)
1− µ
(
F 1(l1t , k
1
t ) + (1− δ)kt
)
, (24)
where H(φ∗) =
∫ η
φ∗ Φt(ωt)dG(Φ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Define M(µ) := H(φ∗)/(1 − µ) in (24). Then, M(µ) can be considered as the
aggregate productivity in the economy. By applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule, one can prove
that as µ → 1, i.e., as the financial market approaches perfection, it follows that
M(µ) → η. This outcome means that only the agents who draw the highest pro-
ductivity become capital producers, and the other agents become lenders when the
financial market is perfect. In this case, allocative inefficiency regarding the interme-
diate goods is perfectly corrected, and the highest aggregate productivity is achieved.
In contrast, we obtain M(0) = H(0), which is equal to the mean of Φt(ωt). When
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µ = 0, there is no financial market and no agent can be a lender or a borrower. In-
stead, all agents become capital producers. The range of variation of M(µ) depends
on the size of the support of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Regarding M(µ),
Lemma 4 is formally obtained.
Lemma 4. As µ increases from 0 to 1, the aggregate productivity, M(µ), also in-
creases from M(0) to η, where M(0) is the mean of the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Inserting (18) into (24) yields a dynamic equation with respect to capital as fol-
lows:
kt+1 = M(µ)
(
1− δ − α
2
Lv(pt)
∆
)
kt +
M(µ)α2K
∆
w(pt). (25)
G(φ∗) = µ and φ∗ = rt+1/qt+1 are used to compute the expected return in Proposition
3 below.
Proposition 3.
E[Rt+1(ωt)|ωt−1] = qt+1M(µ). (26)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Eqs. (12) and (26) rewrite (7) as follows:
pt+1
Λp
−θ1
θ2−θ1
t+1 + 1− δ
= βM(µ)pt, (27)
which is a dynamic equation with respect to the price of consumption goods.
3.5 Steady state
Assumption 2.
0 < η <
1
1− δ
Assumption 2 implies that (1−δ)M(µ) < 1 for all µ ∈ [0, 1). Under Assumption 2,
(1−δ)M(µ) varies from (1−δ)H(0) to (1−δ)η as µ increases from 0 to 1. In the model
with a perfect financial market, the aggregate productivity in capital production is
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constant. In contrast, the current model allows for the aggregate productivity, M(µ),
to vary from H(0) to η, whose upper limit is 1/(1− δ).
Assumption 3. θ2 > θ1 and ∆ = α
1
Lα
2
K − α2Lα1K > 0.
In Benhabib and Nishimura’s model, when the utility function is linear with re-
spect to consumption, indeterminacy of equilibrium always occurs if the intermediate
goods are capital intensive from the social perspective, i.e., θ2 > θ1, and labor inten-
sive from the private perspective, i.e., ∆ > 0. Therefore, we exclusively examine the
case in which θ2 > θ1 and ∆ > 0 to investigate whether indeterminacy occurs when
the financial market is imperfect.
Under Assumption 2, (27) provides the consumption goods price, p∗, in the steady
state, as follows:
p∗ =
(
βΛM(µ)
1− (1− δ)βM(µ)
) θ2−θ1
θ1
. (28)
Furthermore, under Assumption 2, (12), (25), and (28) yield the capital stock, k∗, in
the steady state as follows:
k∗ =
α2KΨΛ
1−θ1
θ1 (βM(µ))
1
θ1
(α2L + β∆− (∆ + α2L)β(1− δ)M(µ)) (1− (1− δ)βM(µ))
1−θ1
θ1
. (29)
To confirm that the economy produces both intermediate and consumption goods
in the steady state, we obtain Lemma 5 below.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, it holds that
α1Kw(p
∗)
α1Lv(p
∗)
< k∗ <
α2Kw(p
∗)
α2Lv(p
∗)
.
Proof: See the Appendix.
From (18) and (19), Lemma 5 implies that the economy imperfectly specializes
in production and consistently produces both intermediate and consumption goods
in the steady state. By continuity, both intermediate and consumption goods are
produced in the neighborhood of the steady state. Throughout the analysis, we
exclusively focus on the case in which the economy produces both intermediate and
consumption goods.
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4 Local dynamics
From (25) and (27), the dynamical system with respect to kt and pt is given by
kt+1 = J(kt, pt)
pt+1
Λp
−θ1
θ2−θ1
t+1 +1−δ
= βM(µ)pt,
(30)
where
J(Yt, pt) = M(µ)
(
1− δ − α
2
Lv(pt)
∆
)
kt +
M(µ)α2K
∆
w(pt).
Note that the second equation is expressed by the consumption price only, because
we assume that agents’ period-wise utility is linear with respect to consumption. The
linearization of the dynamical system (30) around the steady state is obtained as(
kt+1 − k∗
pt+1 − p∗
)
=
(
(∆+α2L)(1−δ)βM(µ)−α2L
β∆
Jp(Y
∗, p∗)
0 θ2−θ1
θ2−θ1(1−δ)βM(µ)
)(
kt − k∗
pt − p∗
)
, (31)
where Jp(k, p) := ∂J(k, p)/∂p. The eigenvalues, κ1 and κ2, of this dynamical system
are given by
κ1 =
(∆ + α2L)(1− δ)βM(µ)− α2L
β∆
(32)
and
κ2 =
θ2 − θ1
θ2 − θ1(1− δ)βM(µ) . (33)
To focus on a typical interesting case, Assumption 4 below is imposed in what follows.
Assumption 4. 1 < α2L/(β∆) < 1/(1− β).
The value of κ1 is crucial for the determination of the dynamic property around
the steady state, although it is easily shown that κ2 ∈ (0, 1), as proven in Lemma
6 in the Appendix. Fig. 2 illustrates the relationship between M(µ) and κ1 under
Assumption 4.
In Fig. 2, two critical values of M(µ) are defined: M1 := (α
2
L−β∆)/[(∆+α2L)(1−
δ)β] and M2 := α
2
L/[(∆ + α
2
L)(1 − δ)β]. We also define µ1 and µ2, if any, such that
M(µ1) = M1 and M(µ2) = M2. As noted in Fig. 2, M1 gives κ1 = −1 and M2 gives
κ1 = 0. Note also that when M(µ) = 1/(1 − δ), we have κ1 = 1 − (1 − β)α2L/(β∆),
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which is less than 1 and is greater than 0 from Assumption 4. The value of κ1 varies
depending on the extent of financial constraints.
Theorem 1. Consider the linearized dynamical system (31). Under Assumptions 1-
4, suppose that the mean of the stochastic productivity shocks, M(0), is smaller than
M1 and that the maximum, η, is greater than M2. Then, if the financial constraint
is severe, the steady state is a saddle point and if the financial constraint is relaxed,
the steady state is totally stable. More concretely, the following hold.
• If µ ∈ [0, µ1), the steady state is a saddle point.
• If µ ∈ (µ1, 1), the steady state is totally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the dynamical system given by (30), kt is a state variable that is pre-determined
at time t, and pt is a jump variable. In Theorem 1 when the steady state is a saddle
point, for any given initial capital, k0, there exist only an initial price of consumption
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goods that yields a sequence {kt, pt}∞t=0 in competitive equilibrium. Accordingly, in
this case, equilibrium is uniquely determined. In contrast, when the steady state is
totally stable, there exists a continuum of initial prices of consumption goods, each
one of which produces a sequence {kt, pt}∞t=0 in competitive equilibrium. In this case,
equilibrium is indeterminate and multiple equilibria occur.
It is widely known that indeterminacy of equilibrium causes self-fulfilling sunspot
business fluctuations (Shell [22]; Azariadis [4]; Cass and Shell [12]; Woodford [23]).
Extrinsic random variables that may have impacts on agents’ expectations without
directly affecting economic fundamentals are called sunspots. If the resource allo-
cation in equilibrium depends on the realization of a sunspot random variable, the
equilibrium is called a sunspot equilibrium. When indeterminacy arises, extrinsic
uncertainty randomizes multiple equilibria. Then, sunspot business fluctuations can
occur as a rational expectations equilibrium. Note from Theorem 1 that when the
financial constraint is severe, no self-fulfilling sunspot business fluctuations occur,
whereas when the financial constraint is relaxed, self-fulfilling sunspot business fluc-
tuations can occur.
5 Concluding remarks
A two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face financial con-
straints and the production sectors exhibit externalities is presented. Whether pro-
duction externalities cause indeterminacy of equilibria depends on the extent of finan-
cial constraints and the size of the support of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
Under the moderate parameter conditions for a labor income share and sector-specific
production externalities, if financial constraints are severe, equilibrium is unique.
However, as financial constraints are relaxed, equilibrium is indeterminate, and thus,
self-fulfilling sunspot business fluctuations can occur.
Recently, it has often been asserted that financial innovations that relax financial
constraints destabilize economies. The outcomes from our analysis are consistent
with this assertion. In our model, the relaxation of financial constraints magnifies the
destabilization effect of production externalities.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It follows from Lemma 1 that∫
Ξt
∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1)dP (ωt)− µ
1− µ
∫
Ω\Ξt
∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1)dP (ωt) = 0.
(A.1)
where Ξt = {ωt ∈ Ω|Φt(ωt) ≤ φt}. (A.1) can be rewritten as∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1)
∫ φt
0
dG(Φ)− µ
1− µ
∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1)
∫ η
φt
dG(Φ) = 0,
which is computed as∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1)
[
G(φt)− µ
1− µ(1−G(φt))
]
= 0.
Solving the last part, we obtain G(φt) = µ. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Because Rt(ωt−1) = max{rt, (qtΦt−1(ωt−1)− rtµ)/(1− µ)}, it follows that∫
Ωt
Rt(ωt−1)st−1(ωt−2)dP t(ωt−1) =
∫
Ωt
max
{
rt,
qtΦt−1(ωt−1)− rtµ
1− µ
}
× st−1(ωt−2)dP t(ωt−1) =: It
Define Ξt−1 = {ωt−1 ∈ Ω|Φt−1(ωt−1) ≤ φt−1}, as in the proof of Proposition 1. Because
φt−1 = rt/qt, It can be computed as follows:
It =
∫
Ωt−1×Ξt−1
rtst−1(ωt−2)dP t(ωt−1)
+
∫
Ωt−1×(Ω\Ξt−1)
qtΦt−1(ωt−1)− rtµ
1− µ st−1(ω
t−2)dP t(ωt−1)
=
∫
Ωt−1×(Ω\Ξt−1)
qtΦt−1(ωt−1)
1− µ st−1(ω
t−2)dP t(ωt−1), (B.1)
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where the second equality of (B.1) is obtained from Lemma 1. Agents who draw
Φt−1(ωt−1) > φt−1 invest xt−1(ωt−1) = st−1(ωt−2)/(1− µ), and thus, (B.1) becomes
It =
∫
Ωt−1×(Ω\Ξt−1)
qtΦt−1(ωt−1)
1− µ (1− µ)xt−1(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1)
= qt
∫
Ωt−1×(Ω\Ξt−1)
Φt−1xt−1(ωt−1)dP t(ωt−1). (B.2)
Because kt =
∫
Ωt−1×(Ω\Ξt−1) Φt−1xt−1(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1), (B.2) becomes
It = qtkt. 
Proof of Lemma 3
By using Lemma 2 and because
∫
Ωt
pitdP
t(ωt−1) = Πt, the aggregation of (6) across
all agents is obtained as follows:∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1) =
∫
Ωt
[Rt(ωt−1)st−1(ωt−2) + wt + pit
− ptct(ωt−1)]dP t(ωt−1)
= qtkt + wt + Πt − ptCt. (C.1)
From (8), we have F 1(l1t , k
1
t )+ptF
2(l2t , k
2
t )+(1−δ)kt = qtkt+wt+Πt. Additionally, the
consumption goods market clearing condition leads to ptF
2(l2t , k
2
t ) = ptCt. Therefore,
(C.1) is transformed into∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP t(ωt−1) = F 1(l1t , k
1
t ) + (1− δ)kt.  (C.2)
Proof of Proposition 2
Because kt+1 is produced by capital producers who draw an individual-specific pro-
ductivity, Φt(ωt), that is greater than φt, Lemma 3 and the i.i.d. assumption compute
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kt+1 as follows:
kt+1 =
∫
Ωt×(Ω\Ξt)
Φt(ωt)xt(ω
t)dP t+1(ωt)
=
∫
Ω\Ξt
∫
Ωt
Φt(ωt)
st(ω
t−1)
1− µ dP
t(ωt−1)dP (ωt)
=
∫ η
φt
Φt(ωt)
1− µ dG(Φ)
∫
Ωt
st(ω
t−1)dP (ωt−1)
=
H(φ∗)
1− µ (F
1(l1t , k
1
t ) + (1− δ)kt),
where H(φ∗) =
∫ η
φ∗ Φt(ωt)dG(Φ) because φt = φ
∗ in equilibrium. .
Proof of Lemma 4
Obviously, M(µ) is continuous in [0, 1). The inverse function theorem implies
∂M(µ)
∂µ
=
∂
∂µ
(
H(φ∗)
1− µ
)
=
−(1− µ)φ∗G′(φ∗)(∂φ∗/∂µ) +H(φ∗)
(1− µ)2
=
∫ h
φ∗ Φt(ωt)dG(Φ)− φ∗(1−G(φ∗))
(1− µ)2 > 0.
Therefore, M(µ) is an increasing function with respect to µ in [0, 1). It is straightfor-
ward to verify that M(0) = H(0) is the mean of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
By applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule, we obtain limµ→1M(µ) = limµ→1G−1(µ)G−1
′
(µ)G′(φ∗) =
η. For the last equality, we have used the inverse function theorem again. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
Because φt = rt+1/q(pt+1) and φt = φ
∗, it follows that
E[Rt+1(ωt)|ωt−1] = E
[
max
{
rt+1,
qt+1Φt(ωt)− rt+1µ
1− µ
} ∣∣∣∣ωt−1]
= qt+1E
[
max
{
φt,
Φt(ωt)− φtµ
1− µ
} ∣∣∣∣ωt−1]
= qt+1
[∫ φ∗
0
φ∗dG(Φ) +
∫ η
φ∗
Φt(ωt)− φ∗µ
1− µ dG(Φ)
]
= qt+1
[
φ∗G(φ∗)− φ
∗µ
1− µ(1−G(φ
∗)) +
H(φ∗)
1− µ
]
= qt+1M(µ).
To derive the last equality, Proposition 1 is applied. 
Proof of Lemma 5
From Assumption 2, it follows that (1−δ)M(µ) < 1. Then, under Assumption 3, from
(12), (28), and (29), it follows that sign{k∗ − α1Kw(p∗)/(α1Lv(p∗))} = sign{1 − (1 −
δ)βM(µ)−α1Kβ(1−(1−δ)M(µ))}. Because 1−(1−δ)βM(µ)−α1Kβ(1−(1−δ)M(µ)) >
(1− α1Kβ)(1− (1− δ)M(µ)) > 0, it follows that sign{k∗ − α1Kw(p∗)/(α1Lv(p∗))} > 0.
Additionally, it follows that sign{α2Kw(p∗)/(α2Lv(p∗))−k∗} = sign{1−(1−δ)M(µ)} >
0. 
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, two lemmata are prepared.
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 1-3, it holds that 0 < κ2 < 1.
Proof. It follows from Assumption 2 that 0 < (1 − δ)βM(µ) < 1, which leads to
(θ2 − θ1)/(θ2 − θ1(1 − δ)βM(µ)) < 1 from Assumptions 1-3. Additionally, it follows
from Assumption 3 that (θ2 − θ1)/(θ2 − θ1(1− δ)βM(µ)) > 0 
Lemma 7. Under Assumptions 1-4, suppose that the mean of the stochastic produc-
tivity shocks, M(0), is smaller than M1 and that the maximum, η, is greater than M2.
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Then, as the value of µ increases from 0 to 1, the value of κ1 increases in the ranges,
as in the following.
• As µ increases in [0, µ1), κ1 increases in [κ˜,−1).
• As µ increases in [µ1, µ2), κ1 increases in [−1, 0).
• As µ increases in [µ2, 1), κ1 increases in [0, κ¯),
where κ˜ := [(∆ + α2L)(1 − δ)βM(0) − α2L]/(β∆) ∈ (−∞,−1) and κ¯ < 1 − (1 −
β)α2L/(β∆) ∈ (0, 1), which is given when M(µ) = η.
Proof. M(µ) is an increasing function with respect to µ. Then, Fig. 2 and (32) prove
the claims. 
Proof of Theorem 1: From Lemma 6, we have |κ2| < 1. From Lemma 7, if
µ ∈ [0, µ1), |κ1| > 1, and if µ ∈ (µ1, 1), |κ1| < 1. Therefore, the steady state is a
saddle point if µ ∈ [0, µ1), and the steady state is totally stable if µ ∈ (µ1, 1). 
References
[1] Aghion, P., Banerjee, A.: Volatility and Growth. Oxford University Press, New
York (2005).
[2] Aghion, P., Banerjee, A., Piketty, T.: Dualism and macroeconomic volatility.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4), 1359-1397 (1999).
[3] Aghion, P., Howitt, P., Mayer-Foulkes, D.: The effect of financial development
on convergence: theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1),
173-222 (2005).
[4] Azariadis, C.: Self-fulfilling prophecies. Journal of Economic Theory 25(3), 380-
396 (1981).
[5] Barinci, J.-P., Che´ron, A.: Sunspots and the business cycle in a finance con-
strained economy. Journal of Economic Theory 97(1), 30-49 (2001).
[6] Benhabib, J., Farmer, R.E.A.: Indeterminacy and increasing returns. Journal of
Economic Theory 63(1), 19-41 (1994).
22
[7] Benhabib, J., Farmer, R.E.A.: Indeterminacy and sector-specific externalities.
Journal of Monetary Economics 37(3), 421-443 (1996).
[8] Benhabib, J., Nishimura, K.: Indeterminacy and sunspots with constant returns.
Journal of Economic Theory 81(1), 58-96 (1998).
[9] Benhabib, J., Meng, Q., Nishimura, K.: Indeterminacy under constant returns
to scale in multisector economies. Econometrica 68(6), 1541-1548 (2000).
[10] Benhabib, J., Wang, P.: Financial constraints, endogenous markups, and self-
fulfilling equilibria. Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 789-805 (2013).
[11] Boldrin, M., Rustichini, A.: Growth and indeterminacy in dynamic models with
externalities. Econometrica 62(2), 323-342 (1994).
[12] Cass, D., Shell, K.: Do sunspots matter? Journal of Political Economy 91(2),
193-227 (1983).
[13] Cordoba, J.-C., Ripoll, CM.: Collateral constraints in a monetary economy.
Journal of the European Economic Association 2(6), 1172-1205 (2004a).
[14] Cordoba, J.-C., Ripoll, M.: Credit cycles redux. International Economic Review
45(4), 1011-1046 (2004b).
[15] Dufourt, F., Nishimura, K., Venditti, A.: Indeterminacy and sunspots in two-
sector RBC models with generalized no-income-effect preferences. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 157, 1056-1080 (2015)
[16] Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J.: Credit cycles. Journal of Political Economy 105(2),
211-248 (1997).
[17] Kunieda, T., Shibata, A.: Asset bubbles, economic growth, and a self-fulfilling
financial crisis. Journal of Monetary Economics 82, 70-84 (2016).
[18] Liu, Z., Wang, P.: Credit constraints and self-fulfilling business cycles. American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6(1), 32-69 (2014).
[19] Nishimura, K., Shimomura, K.: Trade and indeterminacy in a dynamic general
equilibrium model. Journal of Economic Theory 105(1), 244-260 (2002).
23
[20] Nishimura, K., Venditti, A.: Indeterminacy and the role of factor substitutability.
Macroeconomic Dynamics 8(04), 436-465 (2004).
[21] Nishimura, K., Venditti, A.: Indeterminacy in discrete-time infinite-horizon
models with non-linear utility and endogenous labor. Journal of Mathematical
Economics 43(3-4), 446-476 (2007).
[22] Shell, Karl: Monnaie et allocation intertemporelle. Mimeograph, CNRS Semi-
naire Roy-Malinvaud (Paris), November 21, 1977 (1977).
[23] Woodford, M.: Stationary sunspot equilibria: the case of small fluctuations
around a deterministic steady state. Mimeo, University of Chicago (1986a).
[24] Woodford, M.: Stationary sunspot equilibria in a finance constrained economy.
Journal of Economic Theory 40(1), 128-137 (1986b).
24
